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 2 
Introduction 
On a state visit to Australia in 2011, President Obama visited the Australian Parliament where 
he indicated that the United States (US) would move the focus of its foreign policy from the 
Middle East to the Asia Pacific. Had the Middle East been the centre of US foreign policy ever 
since the 9/11 attacks, the President felt that the US had more interests in the Asia Pacific, with 
regard to shared security, prosperity and human dignity (Obama, 2011). The president was 
following his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who has published an article one month 
earlier, in which she laid bare the priorities of the new US policy towards the Asia Pacific 
(Clinton, 2011). 
 The pivot comes at a point in history when scholars have written much about the 
relationship between the US and China, and its future development. For decades, China has 
known continuous growth of its economy, military and population. Scholars have argued 
equally long that there will be a point at which China becomes a challenge to the US global 
leadership. Mearsheimer is an important systemic theorist who argues that the US will not allow 
China to grow endlessly, and if there is no other way to stop China’s growth, will wage war 
(Mearsheimer, 2010). 
 Other theorists have primarily centred around Gilpin’s theory, which argues that history 
has always known one hegemon, which is succeeded by another through a hegemonic war 
(Gilpin, 1981). The application to the US and China is obvious, and the conclusion would be 
that a war between China and the US is inevitable. Gilpin knows criticists as well, notably 
Ikenberry, who argues that the current US-led international system is inclusive, and allows 
China to participate. This takes away the risk of war (Ikenberry, 2014). Then there are those 
who argue that China is in fact not a challenge to the US at all (Wohlforth, 2014), and those 
who argued the world is in fact already bipolar with the US and China both as great powers 
(Layne, 2012). 
 None of the accounts of the US-China relationship take into account the formulation of 
foreign policy, however. They are all systemic theories. Equally, no isolated account of the 
Pivot in a structural sense has been provided so far. This paper will take another point of view. 
Structural realism has been the dominant theoretical perspective in international relations for 
decades. We will first test the extent to which it can account for the pivot. We are expecting 
that certain features of the pivot can be explained by structural realism, but others cannot. The 
main aim of this paper is to test if neoclassical realism can explain those parts of the pivot, 
structural realism cannot. Neoclassical realism is the latest tree in the Realist family, and 
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attempts to merge the classical realist focus on the domestic realm, and the structural realist 
focus on systemic incentives (Rose, 1998). 
The main question this paper will answer is thus: To what extent can neoclassical 
realism add explanatory power to structural realist accounts of the US pivot in Asia to contain 
the rise of China? To find the answer to that question, we will answer two sub questions: Can 
the pivot in its entirety be understood in structural realist terms? and Can domestic level 
variables account for these parts of the pivot structural realisms cannot explain?  
We expect that structural realism can account for balancing behaviour on the US’ part, 
but not for increased cooperation and interdependence. We expect that a focus on domestic 
influences on the policymaking process, as neoclassical realism professes, can give a more 
inclusive account of the Pivot. 
This paper will continue as follows. In the next chapter, we will analyse the most 
important literature on the relationship between the US and China, to conclude that little 
attention has been given to the role of domestic agency.  
In chapter 2, we will present structural realism, neoclassical realism and the hypotheses 
we draw from their accounts on our application to the Pivot. Furthermore, we will reflect on 
the methodology this paper uses. 
In chapter 3, a brief working definition of the pivot will be provided. 
In chapter 4, we will sketch the systemic incentives the US received around the time the 
pivot was announced. Both structural realism and neoclassical realism take systemic incentives 
as the starting point for anything else. 
In chapter 5, we will consider if US behaviour after the pivot can be considered 
balancing behaviour, and if there are parts of the pivot structural realism cannot explain. 
In chapter 6, we will analyse the pivot through a neoclassical lens, and take into account 
what influence leader images, state-society relations, strategic culture and domestic-institutions 
have on agency in the policymaking process. 
Chapter 6 will be followed by a conclusion, in which we sum up our findings.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Much has been written about the development of the relationship between China and the United 
States. This chapter will provide an overview of this vast body of literature. 
 
China is on the rise 
There is no denying that China has grown enormously both in terms of the economy and the 
military over the past few decades. It has transformed its economy, which traditionally centred 
around agriculture, towards a big industrial player. This has led to a 9.4% annual growth, which 
has largely been achieved by trading with other countries. The Chinese leadership now seeks 
to expand its domestic market (Hirst, 2015). Simultaneously, China has been increasing its 
military capabilities, and is expected to surpass the US on some levels by 2020 (Gertz, 2016). 
China’s population has doubled from 1960 up to now, from 0.7 billion to 1.4 billion people 
(The World Bank, 2016). With these remarkable growth levels, China has become a state of 
great capacities. Christensen wrote in 2001, that China’s military was still weak, and that the 
country would avoid any military campaign until the strength of the military was updated. But 
with an updated military, expected in 2005, China could attempt to coerce the US, Taiwan or 
US allies in the region (Christensen, 2001). 
Already in the 1990’s, scholars noticed China’s economic and military rise. Roy argues 
that China is prone to using force long after its economy has grown, for its government is 
authoritarian and unstable. With a less vulnerable economy, independent to foreign supply, 
sanctions are unlikely to tame this forceful behaviour. On the other hand, doing nothing in the 
hope that balancing against China’s rising power will not be necessary is problematic, as is 
engagement, since it allows China to grow and become a big, xenophobic and uncooperative 
state (Roy, 1994). According to Roy, the United States should start balancing already in 1990, 
thus. 
Many works focus on the likelihood of war between the two states. Notably John 
Mearsheimer, whose structural theory will be dealt with in more detail later in this paper, argues 
that a security competition between the US and China is likely, and may lead to a war. He 
argues that there is no chance of China rising peacefully, because the current hegemon, the US, 
will not allow it (Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia, 
2010). Graham Allison, to name another, argues that war between the US and China is likely, 
because 12 of the 16 reviewed cases from the past 500 years displayed that the rise of a new 
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power was followed by war (Allison, 2017). Following the argumentation of both theorists, the 
US would do best to pursue a policy of containment towards the United States.  
Christensen writes that he thinks the debate on what should be the US’ response to 
China’s rise is framed too simplistically. One camp advocates containment through increased 
military presence and alliances, whereas the other camp advocates engagement with China to 
become ‘friends’. Yet, containment would cost the US its regional allies, Christensen thinks, 
making engagement the only option also for those believing the world to be a zero-sum game. 
On the other hand, the US’ maintained presence in the region is the only check to assertive 
Chinese behaviour in untightening anti-Chinese alliances in the region. (Christensen, 2006). In 
principle, Christensen argues here that the regional bipolarity in 2006 was the most stable 
alternative. 
 
Power transitioning theory 
Arguably the most influential theory which has oftentimes been applied to the US-China 
relationship is Robert Gilpin’s power transition theory, which he presents in his 1981 book War 
and Change in World Politics and developed it further in a 1988 article (Gilpin, 1981; 1988). 
His work comes as a response to structural realists, who claim that bipolarity is the most stable 
shape of the international system, since it means that power is balanced. In the next chapter, we 
will explore structural realism’s claims in great depth. Gilpin argues that there is no such thing 
as a balance of power. Instead, he argues that unipolarity is the natural state of the system. 
Hegemonic wars are fought to create new hegemons in a cyclical transformation of the 
international order. Hegemons try to maintain their power through the provision of public 
goods, such as security and money. The United States is the current hegemon, and it provides 
these goods through NATO, the IMF and the World Bank. Gilpin argues furthermore that 
hegemons are bound to fail, often due to overstretching its capacities, making the state 
vulnerable for attack. It is more difficult to stay strong, than to gain when a state is still weak. 
Hegemonic wars can also be triggered by fear of decline. Often, the pretender does not end up 
being the hegemon, as the hegemonic war depletes that state’s resources (Gilpin, 1988).  
Gilpin’s approach resembles the classical realist approach, which can be distinguished 
from the structural realist approach on four fronts: structure is indeterminate, domestic politics 
matter to understand international politics, states are opportunistic by nature, and international 
politics is uncertain, consequential and contingent (Kirshner, 2014). Gilpin’s theory ticks the 
boxes for all of these points. It presumes conflict under anarchy, with states fighting for power, 
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prestige and wealth. Gilpin marries domestic and international politics through the international 
political economy, which he sees as a base for power (Kirshner, 2014). 
 Gilpin’s theory is an obvious candidate for application to the US-China relationship. In 
this scenario, China is seen as the rising power who may challenge the US hegemonic in due 
course. Eventually, a war between the two is then inevitably. Either, because the US attacks out 
of fear, or because China attacks to take over power. Yet, many scholars have criticised this 
application (Beckley, 2011).  
 
A hegemonic war may come 
Scholars are in disagreement over the question if China’s rise must indeed be violent, as 
Gilpin’s theory would have us believe. Using Gilpin’s own ‘rules of the game’, Johnston argues 
that China cannot be seen as a revisionist state operating outside the international community. 
He argues that China may, however, become more revisionist, if domestic social unrest arises 
or an arising security dilemma as a result of the US response to China’s aggression towards 
Taiwan (Johnston, 2003). Inkster argues that, however the relationship between China and the 
US is much better than that between the US and the USSR ever was, it must indeed be 
understood in terms of a declining power versus a rising one. This is a recipe for competition. 
Space and cybersecurity are areas which can act as catalysts to deteriorate the relationship 
(Inkster, 2013).  
A famous author working with and criticising Gilpin’s theory in relation to China and 
the US is Christopher Layne. Layne argues that after the end of the Cold War, China grew as 
the main challenger to the US hegemony. History teaches us that there is no reason to assume 
the rise of China will be peaceful, yet a hegemonic war can be avoided by the US. China’s 
leadership realises that its impressive economic growth is related to its geopolitical strength, 
and that a continuing growth will lead to a takeover of the US as the world’s most powerful 
economy. That leaves the US with two options: engaging or containing. Engaging means that 
engagement with Western states and values will deliver political change in China. Proponents 
claim that this policy will foster liberalism in China. Problematic is the lack of historical 
evidence for economic interdependence leading to peace. Containment policy refers to military 
options to curb China’s rise in power, through enforcement of the alliance with Japan, and the 
maintaining of military superiority over China In the real world, the US employs a mix of both 
strategies, in which Washington allows China to integrate in the US-led global order. If the US 
continues to maintain its dominance in East-Asia, war between China and the US is almost 
certain, following Gilpin’s argument. A last chance to prevent war, would be to adopt a strategy 
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of offshore balancing, in which the US only deploys it military abroad to protect its direct 
interests (Layne, 2008). 
 
A hegemonic war may not come 
John Ikenberry is amongst those who believe the current international system protects us from 
a hegemonic war. He claims that the world is facing a power transition towards multipolarity. 
He asserts that the current rising powers, including but not exclusively China, are rising within 
the current global order of the UN, IMF, World Bank and WTO. Therefore, the liberal world 
order remains unthreatened by China’s rise. Ikenberry argues that the current international order 
is stable, easier to join than any old order and difficult to overturn. That is partly due to its 
integration capacity, and its shared leadership through forums such as the G7 and the G20. It is 
furthermore an order that is beneficial to many, such as China. Lastly, there are different models 
for development in this order, ranging from Thatcherist neoliberalism to the social-democratic 
model. States want to join this order for its openness and its safeguard mechanisms providing 
certainty in anarchy to a certain extent. The rising states should not be considered one bloc, but 
have individual and differing interests. There is in fact a number of states arising and Ikenberry 
prefers to consider this the rise of the middle-class and of democracies (Ikenberry, 2014). 
To China and the US, Ikenberry and Liff advise to recognise that they are trapped in a 
security dilemma, so that they can bargain a way out of a potentially dangerous power 
competition. China and the US should also be more open about how they perceive each other, 
and about their military capabilities and intentions. Diplomatic bargaining structures should be 
enforced and military competition should be placed in the wider context of politics (Liff & 
Ikenberry, 2014). 
Layne argues that from 2012 the world can no longer be considered unipolar with the 
US as global hegemon. He writes that the relative power of the US has declined, like Gilpin 
predicted. With China’s rise, the system is bipolar once again (Layne, 2012). This argument 
goes directly against Gilpin’s claim, which assumes unipolarity to be most stable, and power 
transitioning to come through war. Others do not agree that the world is now bipolar. Schweller 
and Pu argue that a balance of power has not yet emerged, because balancing under unipolarity 
must be preceded by undermining the legitimacy of the American-led international order, or a 
state will be regarded aggressive by other states (Schweller & Pu, 2011).  
 
Does China challenge US hegemony? 
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Wohlforth disagrees with Gilpin and Layne’s argument that the US power has declined, and 
argues that the evidence suggests that US hegemony is self-sustaining, rather. Whereas Gilpin 
claims that hegemonic war is the most important mechanism for change in the international 
system, Wohlforth argues that such a war is unlikely in the nuclear age and, again, history has 
shown the most destructive wars to be unable to establish preconditions. Therefore, unipolarity 
under Chinese hegemony is not as likely as some would claim, but are very unlikely indeed 
(Wohlforth, 2014). The unlikelihood of hegemonic war due to nuclear weapons is something 
Deudney shares with Wohlforth. The paramount distribution of nuclear weapons furthermore 
indicates that, however the US is a hegemon, the world is not unipolar (Deudney, 2014). 
Together with Brooks, Wohlforth argues that the polarity concept is not suitable to 
address the system changes we are facing today. That is, because historical comparisons to the 
concept do not say anything about the speed of Chinese rise, as it does not look like previous 
rising states (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2015). They argue elsewhere that economic power does not 
translate into military power as easily as before. The US remains the military hegemon, and the 
leader of the international order. Economically, the situation is more difficult. But Chinese 
growth weighs heavily on its environment, and will eventually limit economic capacity. The 
Chinese military remains underdeveloped. China may be close to becoming the economic 
superpower, but this alone will not make it a hegemon. Neither will the acquiring of 
technological capacity. Simultaneously, China does not have incentives to invest heavily in the 
military, for the US is not a threatening power (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016). 
Four challenges maintain for the US to preserve its hegemony. Firstly, it should not be 
tempted to bully its allies. Secondly, the US should not overreact when China attempts to use 
its economic superiority on the world stage. The US reaction to the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, which China used to bolster its position, is an example of an overreaction. 
Thirdly, the US should not overstretch its capabilities by intervening in places where its core 
interests are not at play. Lastly, the US should not engage in aggressive military responses, even 
when its interests are at stake. China’s anti-access policy, in which China attempts to block the 
US access to the South-Chinese Sea is an example of an interest which should be responded to 
in a restricted military manner (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016). 
Acharya presents another framework for explaining China’s rise. While acknowledging 
China’s military rebalance, economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and domestic 
reforms are equally important characteristics for China’s rise, he finds that rather than China 
seeking regional hegemony, the region constrains China’s option to do so (Acharya, 2014). 
Wuthnow argues that China militarily challenges the US in maritime Asia, but not in continental 
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Asia. De-escalation should be the focus of US and Chinese policy, and the opportunities arise 
in economic development, and the US should show support for institutions like the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (Wuthnow, 2017). 
Buzan argues that a peaceful rise for China is possible, if it focusses on building a 
regional international society based on Asian values of social and political nationalism, and 
limited economic liberalism. However, China will have to give itself a clearer identity, identify 
the type of international society it wants to lead clearer, and settle disputes with Japan for this 
to be successful (Buzan, 2010). 
 
The gap in the literature 
This overview has shown that much has been written about the systemic incentives that the US 
receives. China grows, and this poses a potential security problem. Predictions have been made 
regarding the proper US response this incentive. There are those who argue the US should 
balance and those who argue the US should increase its interdependence. Then there are those 
who argue which of the options for responding the US is actually pursuing. But the largest piece 
of literature is devoted to the question whether there will be a hegemonic war, and whether 
China is actually posing a risk to US hegemony. A majority of the literature takes Gilpin’s 
power transition theory as the point of departure. That theory is centred around the idea that 
unipolarity is the stable shape of the international system. 
 What lacks in the theory, however, is the inclusion of agency as a causal factor in the 
development of the relationship between the US and China. The vast majority of the literature 
provides us with systemic accounts of the developing relationship, arguing that a certain threat 
level will lead to a certain outcome. Also, a coherent account for the effect of the pivot on the 
relationship has not yet been provided. We aim to lack the gap in the literature, by researching 
the pivot, while including domestic agency factors. 
 In this paper, we will take another viewpoint on the US response to China’s rise. First, 
we will try to establish the extent to which the US is balancing against China, by using structural 
realism, which assumes bipolarity as the most stable shape of the international system. Then, 
we will see the extent to which domestic factors in the US contribute to its response to China’s 
rise, by applying a novel theory to the US-China relationship. 
 In the next chapter, the theoretical foundation of this paper will be dealt with 
extensively. We will furthermore present hypotheses which will be tested later on in this paper.  
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Chapter 2: Theory 
In this chapter, we will address assumptions and hypotheses of this paper. We will then 
operationalise offensive realism, defensive realism and neoclassical realism. Research 
questions will be presented, as will the methodology. A description of the case study this paper 
focuses on will follow. 
 
Research question 
The aim of this paper is to test if the extended explanatory power of neoclassical realism is 
useful in assessing outcomes of international politics. As we will see, in the hypotheses section 
following this section, both defensive realism and offensive realism claim that at some point, 
the US will employ a strategy of balancing. Yet, the systemic pressures behind this strategy are 
different. Neoclassical realism allows us to incorporate domestic variables and foreign policy 
to make conclusions about international outcomes. Does neoclassical realism give us a better 
account of what happened with the Asia Pivot than the structural realisms? 
The central research question in this paper is: 
To what extent can neoclassical realism add explanatory power to structural realist accounts 
of the US pivot in Asia to contain the rise of China? 
This question will be answered in two sub questions.  
1. Can the pivot in its entirety be understood in structural realist terms? 
After this question has been answered, we will continue to apply a neoclassical realist 
perspective to the Asia Pivot.  
2. Can domestic level variables account for these parts of the pivot structural realisms 
cannot explain? 
Our hypotheses are that  
1. Balancing behaviour is observed, but structural realism cannot explain non-military 
parts of the pivot 
2. Structural realisms are unable to explain the US engagement in institutions with China 
and others, its economic interdependence with China, and its focus on human rights. 
3. Neoclassical realism can give a more inclusive account of the Pivot. 
4. Domestic variables matter for appropriately assessing realist behaviour. 
 
Realism 
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Realism is the most dominant theoretical paradigm in international relations. Although modern 
realist theorising began in the 1940’s, it stands in a long history of realist thinking. Thucydides 
(460-395 BC), an Athenian general, is generally acknowledged as the first author to explain 
conflict through a realist perspective in his accounts of the Peloponnesian war (Lebow, 2013).  
A popular modern variant of realism is structural realism, which takes all international 
behaviour as system induced rather than the result of actors’ choices. In structural realism, the 
most important (and opposing) theories are offensive and defensive realism. These will be 
applied in this thesis 
 
Defensive realism 
Defensive realism is first established in Kenneth Waltz’ Theory of International Politics (1979). 
As a structural theory, defensive realism argues that the anarchic system provides incentives to 
states, who decide their action as a result of socialisation and competition amongst states 
(Waltz, 1979). 
 Five characteristics define the structure of the international system: anarchy, rationality, 
insecurity, a quest for survival and a particular distribution of economic and military 
capabilities (Waltz, 1979). By absence of a leviathan to enforce promises or provide protection, 
states are doomed to uncertainty about relative gains of other states (Grieco, 1988). The result 
of this is that in order to survive, states have no choice but to have a substantive amount of 
power relative to other states (Waltz, 1979). Waltz thinks bipolar systems are most stable, as 
both powers will want to preserve the status quo, and thus not engage in conflict as this might 
harm their relative power position. Unipolarity is seen as stable in the short run, but unstable in 
the long run, as overconfidence leaves them to engage in so many external activities, that this 
weakens the state in the long run. Even if the hegemon does not overstretch, other powers will 
consider it a threat, because they are driven by uncertainty over the hegemon’s future behaviour 
(Waltz, 2000). 
 Defensive realists expect two main strategies when states are threatened by an 
increasing power: internal balancing, which is reinforcement of a state’s capabilities, and 
external balancing, or alliance building. This latter strategy shows that there is a possibility for 
cooperation under defensive realism (Waltz, 1979). 
 Waltz pays attention to the role of institutions. They have no independent influence, as 
they are merely reflections of the balance of power. Conditioned by anarchy, institutions cannot 
function as a leviathan by enforcing promises, making them virtually meaningless in the 
determination of state behaviour (Waltz, 1979). That is not to say that they do not serve a 
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purpose: they are means by which great power serve their economic or military purpose. This 
is especially likely in a unipolar system, as cooperation with potential competitors will present 
the hegemon with a certain amount of vulnerability. The goal of this, is to take away concerns 
of exploitation by weaker states. As the state’s hegemony gets challenged, it will put less 
resources into institutions in order to effectively use them on balancing, and to decrease its 
vulnerability (Waltz, 1979). 
 Globalisation has led to interdependence between states. However, this presents states 
with an increased security dilemma, as states can now influence other states’ power position 
and national interests (Waltz, 1999). Furthermore, it is expected that the power position of the 
global hegemon will be challenged by erupting regional hegemons who gain power to upset the 
regional balance of power. Therefore, independent states are stronger than interdependent 
states, and declining hegemons will attempt to maintain their independence, keeping 
vulnerability low (Waltz, 2000). 
 
Offensive realism 
Offensive realism is coined by John Mearsheimer in his seminal work The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics (2001). Its main assertion is that in order to survive, states will want to maximise 
their power at the expense of others to the end that they are the hegemon: the only great power 
left in the world (Mearsheimer, 2001). This differs from defensive realism, in that defensive 
realists argue that states wish to preserve their current position in the system, with balancing as 
its main strategy (Waltz, 1979). Mearsheimer asserts that the status quo will never last long, as 
the system constantly provides incentives to increase more power. 
 Like all realist theories, offensive realism is amoral and does not distinguish between 
good and bad states. It is, however, normative, in that Mearsheimer thinks states will have to 
act according to offensive realism, or they will not survive (Mearsheimer, 2001). Despite 
becoming a global hegemon being the overarching goal, this will not be feasible, as other states 
would not allow it. Therefore, a continuing competition between great powers will last. Military 
capabilities are the key in determining how much a state can tilt the balance of power in their 
favour (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
 Again, like all realist theories, anarchy, uncertainty and rationality are assumed. 
Uncertainty is, however, differently understood than under defensive realism. The status quo 
does not exist, according to Mearsheimer, who claims that no single great power has maintained 
its power for long. The offense-defence debate in defensive realism is not accepted, as states 
cannot distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons (Mearsheimer, 2001). Two other 
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assumptions under offensive realism are that all state seek to survive, or to maintain their 
territorial integrity and autonomy. Secondly, all states have a certain degree of offensive 
military capability with which they could attack other states (Mearsheimer, 2001). Nuclear 
weapons are not considered offensive weapons by defensive and offensive realists alike, as a 
strike would be responded to by a blow out (Mearsheimer, 2013). These assumptions result in 
an international system which is defined by self-help, fear and power maximisation 
(Mearsheimer, 2001; 2013). 
 Mearsheimer presents several strategies for states to behave, and asserts their likelihood 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). The first strategy is balancing. According to defensive realism, this 
strategy is the most employed one, offensive realists disagree. Yet, it is a strategy that is 
sometimes employed, and can consist of setting boundaries to states’ expansion through 
diplomatic channels, creating alliances and strengthening the military. A second, and more 
likely strategy, is buck-passing. This entails letting other (threatened) states deter and fight the 
aggressor, while not doing anything yourself. This is preferred, as it costs less. Mearsheimer 
presents several interpretations of buck-passing behaviour. A last, yet seldom successful option 
is war (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 On the merit of institutions, Mearsheimer is pessimistic, as he asserts that they have had 
little to no independent effect on the behaviour of states (Mearsheimer, 1994). He echoes 
Grieco’s claims that institutions will not prevail long, as every state subject to it will be 
concerned with relative gains (Mearsheimer, 1990).  
 
Theoretical hypotheses 
We assume for the moment that the US is facing an increased security threat from China. 
According to offensive realism, the US would first try and pass the buck, for example through 
offshore balancing. Considering that the US has announced a Pivot, we know that the US taking 
an active role itself, and does thus not engage in buck-passing or offshore balancing. Besides, 
there is no actor to pass the buck to, since it is generally accepted that the US is the only 
superpower in the world. Therefore, the hypotheses for both offensive and defensive realism at 
this point are the same:  
1. Increased security threat will lead to external balancing; creating military alliances. 
2. Increased security threat will lead to internal balancing; increasing and mobilising 
resources 
3. Increased security threat will lead to a decrease in interdependence between the 
threatened state and its challenger. 
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From criticism of structural realism to neoclassical realism 
Realism’s primary contender is liberalism. Scholars have argued that structural realism is better 
fit to explain matters of national security, whereas structural liberalism prevails in its account 
for the international political economy (Grieco, 1988). In response to this, Joseph Grieco clears 
the ground for empirical testing of structural liberalism against structural realism by explaining 
the hypotheses on which the two theories compete (Grieco, 1988). The core difference between 
structural realism and structural liberalism lies in the expected utility function. Both theories 
agree that states will attempt to maximise their utility. However, to liberals, every absolute gain 
that outweighs the costs of cooperation is enough to join. Realists, on the other hand, argue that 
states will perceive their utility as positive only if the gains it will make are bigger than the 
gains the other states in the partnership will make (Grieco, 1988). 
 This paper will focus solely on theories in the realist paradigm. That is, because it wants 
to contribute to the realist body of literature that currently exists. This literature approaches 
China’s rise as a potential threat, rather than a potential opportunity. As mentioned before, 
realism is championed for being able to explain national security, whereas liberalism would be 
better fit to explain the political economy. The pivot contains policy which both impact national 
security and the global political economy. The expectation therefore is, that realist theories 
cannot accurately explain the political component of the pivot. We will research if this also 
goes for neoclassical realism, which is less concerned with structure, and more with agency.  
Structural theories are concerned with the international system. Waltz argues that there 
is an important distinction between international politics and foreign policy (1996). Whereas 
structural theories can explain similar state behaviour under similar circumstances, theories of 
foreign policy can do the exact opposite: explain why states behave differently under similar 
circumstances (Waltz, 1996). The reason for that, is that, according to systemic theories, states 
are unitary actors. Hence, we cannot look ‘under the bonnet’ and see how government officials 
create policy. Theories of foreign policy, on the other hand, do just that. Systemic theories, 
rather, analyse state behaviour. 
 Fearon has argued that this distinction does not hold (1998). He argues that state 
behaviour is always foreign policy or the result thereof. Therefore, there is no useful distinction 
between the two. Waltz’ argument that state behaviour is the result of systemic pressures, 
whereas foreign policy reflects the national interest does not entail that systemic pressures will 
not be dealt with through foreign policy, Fearon argues (Fearon, 1998). 
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 In realism, an alternative theory has been developed to deal with just this matter: 
neoclassical realism.  
 
Neoclassical realism 
In the late 1990’s, Gideon Rose published an article in which he introduced us to neoclassical 
realism (1998). Neoclassical realism is classical, in the sense that it recognises that the domestic 
theatre matters, and that policy makers are rational only in their own perception of their relative 
power. It is structural in the sense that it acknowledges that the international system provides 
incentives to states on how to act (Rose, 1998). 
 As recent as last year, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell have merged all previous work 
on neoclassical realism and developed a theoretical framework (2016). Whereas structural 
realism is deterministic, in that systemic stimuli determine international outcomes, Ripsman et 
al. argue that systemic stimuli are perceived by decision makers, who then make a decision on 
how to act, and implement policy. This leads to one or several foreign policy responses, which 
shape international outcomes. This thus opens up the domestic variables. Perception of 
international stimuli is determined by leader images and strategic culture. Decision making and 
policy implementation is determined by strategic culture, state-societal relations and domestic 
institutions. International outcomes, in turn, influence systemic stimuli (Ripsman, Taliaferro, 
& Lobell, 2016). In neoclassical realism, thus, relative power is the dependent variable, and 
foreign policy is the independent variable. Intervening variables are domestic variables. 
Ripsman et al. graphically present their model as follows (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016, 
p. 34): 
 
Figure 2.1: Neoclassical realist model. Adapted from Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (p.34), by N. 
Ripsman, J. Taliaferro, and S. Lobell, 2016, New York: Oxford University Press. Copyright 2016 by Oxford University Press. 
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Leader images refers to the beliefs and values of the foreign policy executive. These may differ 
from the interests of the societal elite, which is more concerned with maximising economic 
welfare in their business sector (Lobell, 2009). The strategic culture is about both organisational 
culture in, for example, the military, and deep cultural beliefs in society. State-Society relations 
refers to the interaction between economic or societal groups and the state. Domestic 
institutions crystallise state-society relations in organisational routines and processes (Ripsman, 
Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016).  
According to Ripsman et al., neoclassical realism solves the problems of external 
determinism that structural realism has. The international system indeed sends signals, but they 
are not always clear, and can therefore be misunderstood. Furthermore, signals must be 
perceived correctly, even when the signals are clear. Then, if signals are correctly perceived 
and understood, actors do not always act rationally. Lastly, states are constrained by domestic 
variables to mobilise resources effectively (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). As a realist 
theory, anarchy, a quest for power, self-help and confined rationality are assumed (Ripsman, 
Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). Foulon has argued that neoclassical realism bridges gaps in 
international relations literature, with regard to space (domestic versus international), cognition 
(do ideas matter, or is there nothing more than objective facts) and time (the present versus the 
future) (Foulon, 2015). 
 
Neoclassical realist hypotheses 
We are expecting that defensive and offensive realism have not been able to give a full account 
of the pivot. We expect that neoclassical realism can explain more: 
1. Systemic incentives have been unclear, not properly understood, or not adequately dealt 
with by US foreign policy officials. 
2. Strategic culture, leader images, domestic institutions and state-societal relations in the 
US make that the US perception of incentives as well as its decision-making and policy 
implementation lead it to build institution, increase interdependence and focus on 
human rights. 
 
Methodology 
This study is a qualitative case study which tests our hypotheses offensive, defensive and 
neoclassical realism. Realism is a positivist paradigm, with process-tracing and qualitative text 
analysis as its methods. Neoclassical realism furthermore allows for path dependency as a 
method. Our analysis is a structured focused comparison, in which we focus on one policy 
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response (the Asia Pivot), and we compare different theories via several questions to find the 
answer to our main research questions (George, 1989). This paper will primarily use process 
tracing as a method. Both secondary sources and primary sources will be employed. 
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Chapter 3: The Asia Pivot 
Let us begin by defining the pivot under scrutiny in this paper. In 2011, when the Obama 
Administration had been in office for two years, and the US military was withdrawing from 
Afghanistan, the US President first laid bare the US interest in the Asia-Pacific in a speech he 
gave in the Australian Parliament. Here, he stated that the Asia-Pacific region, hosting half of 
the global economy, provided vital opportunities in jobs for the American people. Also, with 
half of humanity on its soil, the region would be decisive in the definition of the century in 
terms of conflict versus cooperation. He indicated three components of the strategy the US 
would employ in turning attention to the Asia-Pacific: security, prosperity and human dignity 
(Obama, Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, 2011). 
 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy one 
month earlier, in which she describes the current point in time the US finds itself as a ‘pivot 
point’. She wrote down six activities which would make up the US strategy regarding the Asia 
rebalance: The US would strengthen bilateral alliances, improve working relationships with 
China and other emerging powers, engage with regional institutions, expand trade and 
investment, increase its military presence, and advance democracy and human rights (Clinton, 
2011).  
 Let us note here already that, although the pivot stresses improved military relationships 
with allies, it does not exclude other powers in the region. In that regard, Secretary Clinton 
explicitly mentions China as included in the pivot. 
Green notes that the Obama administration has endured challenges in the execution of 
the Obama Pivot. It has thus far failed to present a coherent strategy, especially regarding 
China’s rise. This is indicated by the variation in language used to describe the pivot, for all of 
the Obama officials who have spoken out on the pivot did so in different words, emphasising 
different priorities (Green, Hicks, & Cancian, 2016). 
 Over the course of two years, several members of the Obama Administration have 
spoken out on what the Pivot entailed. Three priorities of US policy constitute the pivot. Firstly, 
there is a security element to the pivot. Secondly, economic cooperation is a crucial element of 
the pivot. Lastly, some officials have included human dignity or human rights, but not all 
officials have done so. Whether human rights have been part of the pivot remains up to 
discussion. 
Different departments would thus present different shapes the pivot would get. The 
Department of Defence indicated that defence recourses would be redistributed through a 
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rebalance of capacity and presence in Asia, and through reinforcing relationships with allies in 
Asia as well as other key partners (Department of Defense, 2012).  
 Berteau et al. write that since the pivot was announced, several steps have been taken. 
Guam is protected through an advanced defence system, as well as through additional nuclear 
submarines, operational control to Korea has been delayed, additional US forces are stationed 
in Japan, with more forces headed towards the region, and military cooperation between the US 
and Australia as well as between the US and the Philippines has been agreed upon (Berteau, 
Green, & Cooper, 2014). Furthermore, budget cuts have made the military resource 
redistribution difficult. China’s anti-access/area denial strategy, which it has employed to 
reduce the US power on the South-Chinese Sea as well as China’s continuing investments in 
cyber, the navy, and intelligence, pose a continuing challenge to the US. Green furthermore 
writes that China is not afraid to take risks, and advises the US administration to reinforce the 
pivot (Green, Hicks, & Cancian, 2016). 
 Since the start of the Pivot, China has emphasised that it should not limit China’s options 
to pursue its own interests, Berteau et al. write. They say Chinese leaders envision a global 
order without the US and its allies. In that sense, the pivot may be considered a threat (Berteau, 
Green, & Cooper, 2014). In this sense, particularly China’s claims on islands in the South China 
Sea may prove difficult to coexist with the US rebalance. 
 The second element of the Obama Administration’s pivot is to expand trade. The 
growing middle class and the impressive economic growth make the Asia-Pacific an excellent 
partner for increased investments. Despite the hit the continent took during the 2008 crisis, its 
resilience in getting out of the crisis add to this image. The Asia-Pacific’s importance in the 
world economy and trade has been increasing for a while now and is expected to keep growing. 
Economic integration in the region happens faster than anywhere else (Manyin, 2012). 
 In terms of the economic dimension of the Pivot, the US emphasises its importance of 
improving relationships with institutions, such as ASEAN. Secondly, the Obama 
Administration decided to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is a multinational 
trade deal aimed at integrating the economies of the Asia Pacific and the US. China is not a part 
of the proposed TPP. 
 Lastly, the promotion of human dignity or human rights has been mentioned as a priority 
to the United States.  
 In this chapter, we have presented a definition of the pivot. In sum, the pivot is a 
commitment by the Obama Administration to refocus the US interests to the Asia Pacific 
region. There are three priorities: security, prosperity and human dignity. All willing nations in 
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the region are included, and China is nowhere explicitly excluded. In the next chapter, we will 
see what systemic incentives the United States is receiving with regards to China. 
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Chapter 4: An Increased Security Threat 
Both the arguments of structural realism and neoclassical realism depart from systemic 
incentives. That is, does a state perceive a security threat to which it must respond? In this 
chapter, we will research whether the US is receiving an increased security threat from China 
in 2011, the year the Pivot was announced. 
Let us embark upon potential economic risks China poses to the US. China’s economic 
development over the past decade has been remarkable. The Chinese economy grew much more 
than the US economy, leaving China on the second place in the ranking of countries by GDP 
with over $11,200 billion, after the US with $18,600 billion (IMF, 2016). Since 2000, capital 
flows in to China have increased rapidly, attracting lots of foreign direct investments, more than 
any other emerging market economy. In both inward and outwards investment, China is in 
second place, after the US (Dollar, 2017). This has increased China’s capacity to shape the 
world capital flows. 
China’s continuous economic growth over the past decades has turned it into the biggest 
economic superpower in the Asia Pacific. China is the second biggest trade partner of the US, 
which gives it the power to counter US interests. The US has expressed concern over the 
Chinese trade surplus in relation to the US and the low value of the Chinese currency. As a 
result of the US trade deficit, China bought a lot of US treasury notes, but now the US is 
indebted to China by a large amount. Some are worried that this gives China leverage over the 
US. Simultaneously, If China decided to stop buying these treasury notes, it would plunge the 
US economy into recession (Wolverson & Alessi, 2011).  
This model of borrowing money to cover the huge trade deficit worked relatively well 
for the US, until the 2008 Great Recession hit. The Chinese economy is slowly moving from 
an export-led growth model to a model of domestic consumption (Jain, 2011). If China becomes 
less dependent on US investments in the future, this may lead the two states to becoming rivals. 
The Great Recession had two other effects on the China-US relationship. Firstly, as China was 
harmed much less by the crisis than the US, the relative difference in economic power 
decreased. Secondly, the image of the US was harmed by the crisis, as others hold the US 
responsible for it (Nanto, 2009). 
Now, structural realists do not generally recognise economic threats as threats at all, and 
therefore we will now (in more detail) argue the levels on which China has posed a military 
threat to US interests. 
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China’s current military strategy began in with its dismay in 1995, when in response to 
China’s firing of missiles near the Taiwanese coast, the US sent an aircraft carrier and an assault 
ship to the Taiwan Strait in what is known as the Taiwan-strait crisis. A displeased China could 
only acknowledge that it did not have the power to prevent the US from helping Taiwan’s 
military. As a result, the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy was developed, in which 
China seeks to prevent opponent forces from entering a conflict theatre, and from employing 
military resources. A2/AD is made possible by decades of technological innovations China has 
made. Some argue that by 2020, the Chinese implementation of A2/AD will be so far advanced, 
that the US can be deterred from the first Island Chain, which covers the China sea’s and the 
Taiwan Strait. The DoD expects China to continue their build-up to reach the second Island 
Chain, which runs from Japan from Guam to Papua New Guinea (The Economist, 2012) 
(Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). The US itself believes that by 2020, China wishes to have achieved 
important military and economic successes, and thirty years later, it wants to be an established 
global power (Department of Defense, 2011). 
A2/AD is thus China’s primary military strategy, and it includes a fleet of naval 
destroyers, airpower resources and the development of long-range ballistic missiles. A Chinese 
operation against the US under A2/AD would include disruption of the US reliance on satellites, 
destruction of US military bases across the Pacific through ballistic missiles, protection of the 
1200 nautical mile zone by submarine, protection of the sky through integrated air defence 
systems, including a large fleet of fighter jets, and persistent cyber-attacks to disrupt operational 
capabilities, including command and control (Van Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, & Thomas, 
2010). 
 A2/AD and the goal of being able to control the South China Sea, East China Sea and 
the Taiwan Strait require a large financial investment. The Chinese defence budget has 
increased ever since the Taiwan-Strait crisis, often with double digits higher than the growth in 
GDP. Continuing at this rate, China will be outspending the US very soon (The Economist, 
2012).  
 This military build-up (combined with the economic build-up) led to more assertive 
behaviour on China’s part in which it seeks to serve its interest by military means, at the expense 
of the interests of US-allies and indeed, the US. The theatre for this is, again, the South China 
Sea.  
Sovereignty of some islands and maritime borders in the South China Sea have been 
disputed for years with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan Vietnam and China all 
claiming sovereignty on different grounds. China claims the largest part of the Chinese Sea 
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based on the 9-dash-line, which was drawn in 1947 to justify Chinese claims to the islands after 
the defeat of Japan in the Second World war. China continues to use the 9-dash-line as proof 
for its historic claims to the islands. In 2016, a United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea-tribunal ruled that China’s use of the 9-dash line has no legal basis, but China does not 
recognise this tribunal (BBC, 2016).  
In 2008, Chinese demand for oil rose as a result of the economic growth. Trying to 
decrease its dependence on foreign oil, China increased its offshore oil production in the China 
Sea (Buszynski, 2012). Yet, oil demand of the neighbouring states is on the rise as well, and 
this leads them to create infrastructure and drill for oil in their exclusive economic zones. China, 
has employed A2/AD to prevent this from happening. Simultaneously, often Chinese vessels 
stop or seize other states’ fishing vessels in these states’ exclusive economic zone (Buszynski, 
2012). To the US government, freedom of navigation in this sea is a national interest, as it is an 
important trade route from the Asia-Pacific to the US. That interest is threatened by Chinese 
assertiveness, says a high State department official in front of a Senate Committee (Marciel, 
2009).  
But the security threat from China goes further. The Chinese military performs daily 
hacking operations on the US. The US Defence Department claims China employs thousands 
of hackers and puts lots of resources in the hacking industry and in hacking expertise. Notable 
examples include the Chinese hacking Secretary Clinton’s drive and Google (Rogin, 2010). 
Hacking by the Chinese is a real security threat for several reasons. Firstly, it leaves the US 
vulnerable for leverage. There could be secrets on Secretary Clinton’s server that China can 
seek to exploit. This can be both private and official secrets. Secondly, it can constitute outright 
theft of intellectual property, or even digital resources. Lastly, it poses a direct physical threat 
if China manages to hack into security systems in the US causing latter to lose control over 
these systems. 
In sum, we have argued that at the time of the pivot, the Chinese military and economic 
growth have happened at the expense of the relative power position of the US. US interests are 
directly jeopardised by China in the South China Sea, and with regards to China’s trade surplus. 
According to the structural realist theories, the systemic incentives force the US to increase its 
power position, leading to balancing behaviour. Neoclassical realism now continues to research 
the US’ perception of this threat, the decision-making environment and the policy 
implementation phase to see what types of foreign policy will be created.  
This paper continues as follows. In the next chapter, we will see if we observe balancing 
behaviour. To that end, we will be looking at international outcomes. In the subsequent 
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chapters, we will analyse domestic factors that contributed to the US’ decisions leading to the 
outcome presented in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4: Is the Pivot a balancing act? 
In this chapter, we will test to see if the pivot can be seen as a balancing act, such as the 
structural realist theories would predict if states are threatened. In the previous chapter, we have 
shown that the international system provided the US with an increased security threat. Now we 
will assess if the measures taken under the pivot can be considered a balancing act. This will 
be proven if there is an increase in internal and external military presence. Both structural 
realisms argue that in case of an increased security threat, the US would decrease its 
interdependence with China, and withdraw from institutions.  
 
Enforcing Alliances 
The US has official alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Thailand. Not once since the first world war have Australia and the US not been on the same 
side of a major conflict. Australia’s influence in the world grows, and hence becomes more 
important to the US. For Australia, enhancing its maritime capabilities and facilitating effective 
US operations on their territory are very important. Since the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, which makes the US responsible for Japan’s security in exchange 
for US bases, Japan has been an important ally to the US. Japan wishes to expand its military 
capacities to take on a greater leadership position and the two countries updated the guidelines 
for defence cooperation in 2016. Japan has also reinforced alliances with Australia and India. 
This serves the US strategic goals in the region. The US alliance with South Korea has deterred 
a North Korean invasion for 65 years, and is characterised by the Obama and Park 
administrations as very strong. The US and South Korea are in the process of developing new 
defence capabilities. A less strong – but still treaty –ally to the US is the Philippines. Yet, its 
location in the first island ring, and persevering conflicts with China, make its security vital to 
the US interests. Its oldest ally in the region, a coup in 2014 have weakened US military ties 
with Thailand (Green, Hicks, & Cancian, 2016).  
State visits made by the President or the State Secretary have increased under the Obama 
Administration since the announcement of the pivot (Department of State, n.d.). This leads us 
to believe that the US has put more emphasis on these alliances.  
 
Increasing military resources 
Apart from strengthening alliances, the US has also increased its military resources in 
the region. The US is the country with the greatest defence expenditure. In 2012, they spent 
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over $680 billion. After a yearly increase in spending since the 9/11 attacks, both actual and 
relative military expenditure in the US have dropped since 2010 (World Bank, 2016). This 
seems to be in opposition to the structural realist prediction of balancing. However, let us look 
at the US military presence in the Asia Pacific since the pivot was announced.  
Figures from the US Department of Defence show that the US has increased its 
personnel deployment at their allies by 7,271, starting with 85,457 people in 2010 to 92,728 
people in 2015, which represents an increase of 8.5% (DMDC, n.d.). In China, 16 military 
staffers were present in 2009, whereas in 2014 there were 65. In the rest of the pacific, personnel 
increased from 10,308 to 11,530, an increase of 11.9% (DMDC, n.d.). The total troop 
deployment has increased in every country, except for the Philippines and Thailand, where the 
number of active personnel dropped considerably. Particularly in Japan, South Korea and on 
the US territory of Guam the number of US military personnel deployed has increased (DMDC, 
n.d.).  
Simultaneously, the US has fought back against China’s A2/AD strategy by employing 
an AirSea Battle approach, which is both capable of defending the US and its allies against 
Chinese missiles, and of attacking Chinese forces employed under A2/AD. US air, cyber, 
maritime and space forces together can be employed to make sure Chinese sensors do not work 
properly anymore, and Chinese weapons under A2/AD can be destroyed (Biddle & Oelrich, 
2016). Biddle and Oelrich believe that this counter strategy by the US will on the long run limit 
China’s ability to pose a long-term threat to the US, and will contain it to a small geographical 
area, simultaneously preventing it from military hegemony in the Pacific (Biddle & Oelrich, 
2016). 
President Obama also employed so called ‘Freedom of Navigation Operations’ 
(FONOPS) in the South China Sea. FONOPS have been in use for over 40 years, but under 
Obama, they have only been employed in the South China Sea. In a South China Sea FONOP, 
US naval ships sail within zones which China considers part of its territory. This again is a clear 
example of the Obama administrations military muscle flexing to protect its interest in freedom 
of navigation, which is challenged by China (Freund, 2017). 
In 2009, an agreement was reached between the US and Japanese Government, which 
allows for the relocation of 5000 US marines from Japan to Guam (Department of State, 2009). 
Simultaneous to his introduction of the pivot in the Australian Parliament, President Obama 
announced the relocation of 2500 Marines to Australia over the next couple of years. This is 
part of Obama’s rotational system, in which the US would maintain bases in Japan, South Korea 
and Guam, but the stationing between these bases would rotate rather than be fixed. Training 
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of local militaries to occupy the bases during the American absence is also part of this plan. In 
this way, security in the region can be increased, but the burden would not solely lie with the 
US (Kaufman, 2011). In 2014, the US signed a deal with the Philippines as well, further 
increasing its military presence in the South China Sea by enabling the US to use five military 
installations in the country (Lamothe, 2016).  
The US military has worked to fight off cyber-attacks as well. The US Cyber Command 
was established already in 2009, in which members of each of the military branches come 
together to discuss cyber threats. It attracted 3,000 to 4,000 staffers to combat hacks. But that 
is not all, the Cyber Command also focused on offense scenarios to safeguard the country 
(Strobel & Charles, 2013). The US’ approach has worked so far. Yet, some argue that anti-
cyber should be a whole new branch of the military to resolve inefficiencies (Graham, 2016). 
The US took its cyber defence to the court room when it charged Chinese Military Hackers for 
cyber espionage in 2014 (Department of Justice, 2014).  
In sum, although the total military expenditure in the US has dropped, the number of 
Active Military personnel to the Asia Pacific has increased. What is more, the US has enhanced 
its alliances in the region, and made deals with Japan and the Philippines to increase its military 
installations. Obama has furthermore employed six FONOPS in the South China Sea and 
combated the Chinese in a cyber war. This seems to indicate that there is an extent of balancing 
behaviour. In that sense, structural realism predicted this correctly. Now, structural realism also 
predicts that the US would attempt to decrease its interdependence with China, and withdraw 
from international institutions. Let us see if we see this behaviour as well. 
 
Yet trade and interdependence are not going down… 
In order to see if the US attempted to decrease the interdependence with China, let us look at 
China’s position of foreign debt. As previously explained, China’s export-led growth model 
leads it to buy US treasury securities. This potentially gives it leverage over US politics. If the 
US wants to decrease its interdependence with China, it would want to limit Chinese ownership 
of its debt. 
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Figure 4.1: Chinese possession of US debt in trillions of dollars (right) and as percentage of total foreign possession of US 
debt (left) in September of the years 2010-2014. Adapted from Major Holders of Treasury Securities, in US Treasury, 
November 15, 2017, Retrieved November 20, 2017, from http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfhhis01.txt. Copyright 2017 by 
Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board. 
There does not seem to be a consistent decrease in both absolute and relative Chinese possession 
of US debt after the pivot was announced. Yet, a trough can be observed in 2012, one year after 
the pivot was announced. However, this is probably not as a result of the pivot. The Chinese 
government had been concerned over the safety of its holdings for several years at that point. 
In 2011, the US government raised the foreign debt cap, which led to the downgrading of their 
long-term sovereign credit. It is thus thinkable that the Chinese government thus decided to buy 
less Treasury securities in the subsequent year. However, the subsequent year, the height of US 
debt owned by China increased again. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the US has attempted 
to decrease China’s possession of its debt (Morrison & Labonte, 2013).  
 Together with decreasing the Chinese possession of US debt, structural realism would 
expect the US to attempt to tilt the trade balance in order to decrease the huge deficit it has. 
This could be done through the imposition of tariffs or other trade barriers. If we look at the 
figures, however, we see no pivot in the development of the trade balance at all. In fact, a steady 
increase in imports, and a smaller increase in exports appear to have occurred. The trade deficit 
deteriorates in the period following the announcement of the pivot (United States Census, n.d.). 
In conclusion, in terms of economic interdependence, we do not witness a pivot. That is 
contrary to both defensive and offensive realist expectations for state behaviour in times of an 
increased threat level. Let us lastly focus on the US participation in institutions. Structural 
realism expects the US to withdraw its activities from institutions in times of increased 
perceived threats. 
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… and the US does not engage less in institutions 
In 1997, Asia plunged into an economic crisis when the Thai government refused to devaluate 
its currency which had been under speculative attack. The IMF gave out bail out loans at huge 
costs for the employment level in the affected countries, and Asian leaders thought that the 
cutbacks in public spending, rising interest rates and floating interest rates were not fit to solve 
this particular crisis. This led to criticism of the IMF and its guardian, the United States which 
refused the set-up of an Asian monetary fund for future crises. Simultaneously, it was the first 
instance which displayed the limited power of the Asian institutions of ASEAN (Association 
of South East Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) to deal with 
crises (Higgot, 2007).  
ASEAN’s failure to solve the crisis led to the continued development of multi-level 
regionalism. The ASEAN-members and China, Japan and South Korea decided to set up a new 
economic bloc, APT (ASEAN plus three) right after the 1997 crisis. Economic integration in 
the region has continued over time. The latest addition is the 2015 erection of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, which is the seventh biggest common market in the 
world (ASEAN, n.d.). Here is an overview of all the regional organisations in the Asia Pacific. 
It is obvious that the US is part of many of them. But even with the one’s it is not a part of, the 
US holds and maintains relations. 
Under Obama, the US set up a mission to ASEAN, which it considers a very important 
institution for economic, political and security cooperation. In 2005, the US commenced this 
cooperation at the proclamation of U.S.-ASEAN. Rather than loosening these ties, the Obama 
administration seems to have enhanced them. Clinton made sure that the US joined the EAS 
(East Asian Summit) from 2011 onwards (CSIS, 2010). She furthermore called upon ASEAN 
to draft a code of conduct to solve the disputes on the South China Sea (BBC News, 2012). The 
US even established a permanent mission to ASEAN in 2010, and appointed a resident 
ambassador in 2011. The US/ASEAN relationship was updated to a strategic partnership in 
2015 (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.). The US has used the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) as 
a means to employ diplomacy to prevent escalation regarding the South China Sea, or North 
Korea. It took a leading role in this forum, and even chaired a meeting on maritime security in 
2011 (CSIS, 2012). Lastly, the US is a member of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). 
In 2011, new objectives for this membership were aimed at maintaining a leading position and 
enhancing economic integration into the Asia-Pacific (Donilon, 2013). 
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 All this interaction is contrary to the behaviour structural realist theories expect in times 
of an increased threat level. But there is more. The US joined a 2005 initiative by Brunei, Chile, 
New Zealand and Singapore to set up a free trade-zone called Trans-Pacific Partnership in 
2009 (Kirk, 2009).  
 Now, the US participation in international institutions, and its continued trade with 
China are actually mentioned as part of the pivot on the several occasions on which Obama 
administration officials have offered their interpretation of the pivot. Noteworthy, trade and 
regional institutions are one of the three pillars that are mentioned by all officials. Hillary 
Clinton even specifically mentions in her Foreign Policy article that China is not being left out 
when it comes to enhanced regional institutionalism and continued trade (Clinton, 2011). 
However, it is not in line with structural realist expectations of state behaviour under increased 
threat levels. 
 
Human rights are not a real priority 
The last part of the pivot refers to human decency and human rights. President Obama has made 
several steps to promote human rights in the Asia Pacific. He pushed for LGBT-rights abroad 
by nominating gay ambassadors to several allies in the region. David Huebner and John Berry 
served in New Zealand and Australia respectively, both countries in which same-sex marriage 
was not performed or banned by law at the time of the installation of the ambassadors. But more 
notably was the appointment of Osius as US Ambassador to Vietnam, where there are no legal 
protections against discrimination of LGBT-people, and where homosexuality is generally 
considered a taboo (Mosbergen, 2015). 
 Furthermore, US embassies participated in pride parades in the region.  Yet, Obama’s 
push for LGBT-rights is not focused solely on the Asia pacific. Gay ambassadors were also 
appointed to other places, such as Europe and Latin America (The Guardian, 2014). The bottom 
line remains that according to structural realist thinking, it is highly irrational to force one’s 
allies into certain behaviour at risk of antagonising them while being threatened by another 
actor. There is no way in which structural realism can account for Obama’s push for gay rights 
abroad. 
 Perhaps that is why Obama did not do much more on human rights towards his allies. 
To China itself, Obama has done little to improve human rights, with the President only calling 
out differences of opinion with China regarding several human rights on several occasions, 
rather than threatening with sanctions or taking other hard measures to implement this core 
value of his pivot (Perlez, 2016). 
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To sum up 
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that structural realism cannot fully explain US 
policy towards China. It did correctly predict US attempts to balance, by enhancing relations 
with allies and increasing its regional military capacity (despite the overall capacity decreasing 
due to cutbacks). It fails, however, in explaining increased US engagement in regional 
international institutions, the continuous trade with China and the US’ decision to promote 
LGBT-rights at allied countries. In the next chapter, we will see if neoclassical realism can 
provide us with an explanation for this particular US behaviour. 
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Chapter 6: Neorealism and the Pivot 
In the previous chapter, we concluded that structural realism can properly account for the US’ 
military expansion in the Asia-Pacific. However, we found that it could not explain the US’ 
increased engagement in the region in terms of institutions and trade. In this chapter, we will 
see whether the intervening variables that neoclassical realism point at can account for this 
defection from the response to the received systemic incentives that structural realists and 
neoclassical realists find proper. 
Three phases of policy making are mentioned in which a response to systemic incentives 
is drafted: the perception phase, in which leaders perceive systemic incentives; the decision-
making phase and the policy implementation phase. These phases are influenced by the leader’s 
values; the strategic culture; state-society relations and domestic institutions. In this chapter, 
we take the policy responses ‘increasing involvement in institutions’ and ‘increased multilateral 
trade’ for granted. We will focus on the intervening variables to see if they can account for 
these policy responses. Firstly, we will briefly present a working definition for the mechanisms 
which determine the three phases (leader images, strategic culture, state-societal relations and 
domestic institutions). Then, we will discuss the three phases (perception, decision-making and 
policy-implementation) which form the bridge between systemic incentives and foreign policy. 
 
Mechanisms 
Leader Images 
Let us begin by looking at the perception of systemic stimuli by the foreign policy executive of 
the United States: Barack Obama. Jeffrey Bader, chairman of the National Security Council for 
Asian Affairs, writes that Obama was aware of the growth of Chinese ownership of US debt, 
as well as the growth in Chinese military expenditure, and that many Americans considered 
that to be a threat. Yet, America had encouraged China to grow for decades, and now that China 
is fully incorporated in the global economy, containment is not an option. Obama and his team 
thought that China’s growth might mean that it could play a constructive role in the world, since 
in his mind, it lacked the aspirations of the former Soviet Union. Hence, despite the remaining 
uncertainty surrounding China’s growth, Obama was confident that it was not a bad thing, but 
could become a force for good (Bader, 2013).  
 
Strategic Culture 
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Research after the American military culture begin in the 1970’s, when Weigley argued that 
the US usually pursues an absolute form of war which seeks the complete overthrow of the 
enemy. Hence, typically speaking, the US views war as an alternative to negotiations, rather 
than a complementary option, Weigley claims. This way of war is accompanied with a belief 
that war should only be fought with clear objectives in mind, and to protect the national interest. 
Alternatively, Booth has presented an argument in 2002, that the US fights another type of wars 
as well: small wars. These wars are fought as a means of punishment, to bring peace or to stay 
safe. What both approaches share, is that in American Strategic culture, there is a clear 
distinction between politics and fighting. The diplomatic fight is fought by politicians 
(Echevarria II, 2004). 
 American deep-core values are characterised by its appreciation for diversity as a result 
of the immigration from different cultures that has characterised the nation for centuries. 
Citizen’s trust in the government has eroded in the 20th century, to a low of 22% by the time 
the pivot began. Scepticism exists of the government, with Americans trusting private persons 
and companies more. However, there is a great sense of national pride. Influence of passing on 
values over generations has historically been primarily with the parents, but mass media gained 
influence over the past decades (Kousser & Austin, 2012). Lastly, US values of freedom and 
property are embodied in citizens’ appreciation for property and markets, or capitalism (The 
Economist, 2015). 
 Let us complement that by some information on current attitudes of the American 
citizens around the time the pivot began. Two-thirds thought the country was headed the wrong 
way. Nearly half thought American values were about to lose influence. Freedom of Speech 
and Religion are ranked the most important. The influence of religion is decreasing, and 
American’s consider themselves more tolerant than their parents. 60% thought the economy 
was on the wrong track. Budget deficits are considered to undermine US values, and a huge 
majority thinks the financial sector has worse values than US values. Almost 3 out of 4 think 
their representatives actually represent the values of the rich, and 80 percent think that lobbyists 
have too much influence. Over three-quarters think people are intrinsically driven by self-
interest (Cohn, 2012). 
 
State Societal Relations 
State Societal relations refer to the possibilities for different groups in society to influence 
policy. It is important to identify what are the elites in a country, and what their primary interest 
is. Furthermore, opportunities for ordinary citizens to influence policy should be identified.  
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 The elites in the United States arguably consist of senior politicians and big business. 
Drutman has argued that the influence of large corporations on the policy making process has 
become very large. Washington increasingly relies on the private sector for expertise. 
Corporations primarily lobby members of Congress (Drutman, 2015). Ordinary citizens have 
influence in so far that they are formally represented by their members of congress. 
Furthermore, they have the opportunity to have their voice heard in traditional and social media. 
American citizens have greater than average confidence that they are able to influence policy. 
Particularly, American’s feel they are entitled to certain rights and do not want to wait for policy 
officials to act, but do not hesitate to file law suits to get their rights (Kousser & Austin, 2012).  
 The main concern of all societal actors at this point is the economic crisis that hit the 
United States in 2008. As a result of the bursting of a housing bubble and a mortgage debt crisis, 
the country plunged into a catastrophic recession, which led to the loss of millions of jobs, 
leading unemployment to peak at 10%, and a contraction of the economy by over 5% (Rich, 
2013). All social groups were affected by this crisis, and were eager to fix the economy. 
 
Domestic Institutions 
It is important to distinguish between the different institutions that deal with foreign policy. 
Firstly, there is the State Department, led by the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and her 
successor John Kerry. Simultaneously, other departments are involved in foreign policy when 
issues touch upon their agenda. Notably, the Department of Defence is responsible for the 
defence of the nation. The department is led on a civilian level by the Secretary of Defence, and 
on a military level by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who head the respective branches of the armed 
forces. Then there is the CIA, but unfortunately, there is not much to write about their findings 
with regard to the pivot, as their work is covert. Another very important actor in Foreign Policy 
is the National Security Council, which consists of the leaders of all aforementioned actors, 
plus the President and Vice President, a national security advisor and about 12 government 
officials. Jeffrey Bader was a member of the National Security Council, and has published an 
insiders account on Obama’s China policy (Bader, 2013).  
The executive powers of foreign policy are sometimes divided between Congress and 
the President. The President has sole command of the military, and the Congress has sole power 
over regulation of foreign commerce. Notable other powers of Congress are that the Senate 
must approve treaties, and to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper”, which 
include laws on international sanctions (Masters, 2017).  In general, the Congress should 
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oversee the President, to check and balance his power. It has informal influence through this 
role, and formal influence through the conduct of investigations. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section, we have made explicit what forces can influence the policymaking process. 
Firstly, Obama’s perception of China’s rise is influenced by his belief that this can constitute 
something good. Secondly, we have mentioned society’s core beliefs and the importance of 
technology in US culture. Thirdly, we have talked about ways of interaction between societal 
groups and their main concern at the time of the pivot: The Great Recession. Lastly, we talked 
about which institutional actors are involved at foreign policy making. In the next section, we 
will look at the policymaking process. 
Three phases 
In the previous section, we have given a brief overview of the factors that can influence the 
three stages of policymaking neoclassical realism recognises. In this section, we will zoom in 
on these three stages: perception, decision-making and policy implementation. 
Much information in this section has been found in Jeffrey Bader’s book Obama and 
China’s Rise. Bader was on Obama’s National Security Council as the main advisor for East-
Asia. His account of what happened inside the policymaking process is incredibly relevant to 
assessing neoclassical realist hypotheses, because it is the closest we can get to hearing the 
Administration’s own internal voices.   
 
Perception 
 Obama was eager to pivot US attention away from the Middle East, towards the Asia 
Pacific. This perception is strengthened by Obama’s belief that the Middle East is a toxic place 
that is beyond repair. He contrasts that with what he sees in the people of Southeast Asia by 
saying “They are not thinking about how to kill Americans, […] What they’re thinking about 
is How do I get a better education? How do I create something of value?” (Obama, The Obama 
Doctrine, 2016).  
 The president and his team thought that its China policy should be a mix between the 
carrot and the stick. Military power, economic sanctions and other types of sanctions alone 
would prove counterproductive. Simultaneously, doing nothing, or accepting Chinese 
dominance would scare US allies, and be equally unproductive. Obama’s emphasis on norms 
were neither inspired by Wilson-style internationalism, nor by a blind staring on the balance of 
power. Instead, a pragmatic point of view to understand the importance of strong bilateral 
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relations is needed to shape the direction of allies and others alike, though both diplomacy and 
deployment. Obama’s understanding of the best possible relationship with China becomes clear 
as well on his first trip to the country in November 2009, when he argued what cooperation 
benefits all, whereas confrontation would serve neither (Bader, 2013). Obama’s pragmatism 
has been recognised by International Relations scholars as well. Stephen Waltz criticised 
Obama’s failure to identify a clear set of US interests (Walt, 2016).  
Some US allies were suspicious of Obama and the Democrats, as a persisting sentiment 
exists of the republicans being pro-Japan, and the Democrats pro-China. In general, some allies 
regarded Republicans to care more about US allies, with Democrats preferring protectionist 
politics. This sentiment was fed during the 2008-presidential campaign, when both Obama and 
Clinton would come out against a free-trade agreement between South-Korea and the US, 
brokered by Bush, with Clinton adding that this would have negative consequences for import 
from China. The democrats were mistrusted by Asian nations as well, for their traditional 
human rights rhetoric and policies. Obama and Clinton were not relieved from this distrust by 
their track record, with former writing his biography on human rights victories, and latter 
devoting much of her career to women’s rights (Bader, 2013). 
Increasing trade with China has not always been president Obama’s policy objective in 
relation to China. In 2009, he imposed a 35% tariff on Chinese tires, to rescue jobs lost in this 
industry. This tariff ended in 2012, and Obama publicly stated that 1200 jobs were saved, but 
in fact, higher prices cost the US $1,1b, and over 3,500 jobs were lost in retail. China retaliated 
by imposing penalties on the import of chicken parts, which cost the US an additional $1b 
(Gillespie, 2017). Potentially, Obama concluded from this event that imposing tariffs is no way 
of saving jobs, and changed course. 
 A specific systemic incentive comes as the Chinese push their maritime dominance to 
the next level by troubling Southeast Asian fishing vessels in the South China Sea, and the 
couple months later conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US-leadership 
perceived this as a threat to the international order centred around the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, but through its reiteration of the neutral stance of the US government, the US 
leadership perceived China’s image to be harmed the most (Bader, 2013).  
 Obama’s foreign policy successes can also be explained by the lack of successes in 
domestic policymaking. After the Congressional Elections in 2010, much of Obama’s 
Democratic domestic agenda was blocked in the Republican-dominated Congress. Foreign 
policy would hence provide easier victories. Besides, the Pivot was appreciated more by 
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Republicans than by Democrats, so perhaps Obama hoped that he could get some leeway on 
his domestic agenda by performing a rather Republican Foreign one (Mislan, 2017). 
 
Decision making 
Obama’s National Security Council concluded that the US should participate more actively in 
regional organisations. This was a shift from Bush’s foreign policy, which sought to refrain 
from involvement in regional institutions, as his administration felt they were mere talk shops, 
and they struggled to decide which would prove to be the most important one. Obama’s team, 
on the other hand, thought this involvement would comfort US allies concerned with China’s 
rise. The president has three priorities in his foreign policy, which he felt would also be 
important in the US relationship with China: Iran and North-Korea’s nuclear ambitions and 
combatting climate change. Obama’s team assessed the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region 
as welcomed by most states in the region. They thought that the region considered the US to be 
a stabilising force, bringing trade, innovation, educational chances and security of global public 
goods, of the weaker states. Simultaneously, the national security team was driven by 
pragmatism –not ideology. This pragmatic point of view led the president to believe that 
allowing allies and others alike to play a bigger role in economic institutions would allow the 
US to affect the choices these countries will make (Bader, 2013). 
 The Obama administration is facing domestic opposition from the senate, with some 
prominent members demanding the Treasury Department to call out China as a currency 
manipulator. The Treasurer refused, understanding that US persuasive power to progress that 
situation would be seriously harmed if the US would call out China as a currency manipulator 
(Reid, 2011). The problem of labelling China as a currency manipulator returned in the 2012-
presidential election, when Obama’s opponent Mitt Romney (Republican Party) called out 
Obama for his failure to label China as such, and he promised to do so himself once elected 
president, and consequently impose tariffs on Chinese goods (Keating, 2012).  
 In 2010, the House approved legislation to allow the president to impose tariffs on 
China. Obama has been hesitant to do this. He consequently attempted to use the public anger 
over China’s huge trade surplus to convince China to quit manipulating its currency. Obama 
has been careful not to anger China in order to prevent a trade war. Simultaneously, his foreign 
policy goals of cutting exports to Iran and solving the North-Korean problem involved China, 
which he therefore wished not to antagonise too much (Sanger & Chan, 2010).  
 Four years later, Obama sought Congress’ approval to negotiate a trade deal with other 
South-East Asian countries. Democratic Senate Majority Leader Reid called TPP dead while 
 38 
attempting to stop a vote on fast-track legislation. The Democrats in Congress are divided over 
the policy of trade deals in general, slowing down progress in this matter. President Obama 
sought to increase trade by joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Obama gained fast-track 
powers to negotiate TPP through support of the Republican Party, with only 13 of his own 
party’s members in support (Kim, 2015). Fast-track refers to time-limited discretion given to 
the president to broker a trade deal under certain conditions, a responsibility that is 
constitutionally positioned with Congress (Fergusson & Davis, 2017). 
 The fast-track of the TPP bill was supported heavily by lobbyists representing big 
businesses. That is evidenced by the fact that they spent over 1,1 million dollars, and donated 
over 17,5 thousand dollars on average to each individual senator who voted in favour of the bill 
(Gibson & Channing, 2015). Obama faced opposition from labour unions and Democrats, who 
want to avoid a repetition of the NAFTA-trade deal with Canada and Mexico of the 1990’s, 
which allegedly resulted in the loss of jobs in manufacturing and a trade deficit (Lewis, 2015). 
Yet, opposition was centred around many things, like fear of losing jobs, lowering US 
standards, or too much power for corporations who could sue states over regulations which curb 
their profits (Carter, Terkel, & Grim, 2015). Opposition did not focus on the increased 
interdependency the US would find itself in in times of hegemonic competition. Yet, Obama 
believed that trade was a vital component to recover the US economy, hit by the Great 
Recession. When he received fast track, he could start negotiations of the trade deal. 
 As a way of allowing forces other than China in the region to grow and take on a 
leadership role, the Obama administration wanted to improve its relations with Indonesia 
through linkages of government agencies. Yet, linkage to the Indonesian counter-terrorism 
agency proved to be domestically contested in Congress and the human rights committee, for 
this agency has committed human rights violations in the 1990’s. Commitments of the 
Indonesian leadership helped make sure that this linkage could continue, however (Bader, 
2013). 
 Mislan claims the Department of Defence has known quite some fighting about whether 
or not to join in on the Pivot. It had set up a Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organisation to 
deal with insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. But its existence was threatened when these 
wars came to an end, and survival of this organisation could be guaranteed by joining in on 
supporting the Pivot, and so a strategy was drafted in which the Organisation could assist in the 
Pivot (Mislan, 2017). 
 State-societal relations in 2009 were characterised by the economic crisis. The fact that 
China was running a huge trade surplus, US unemployment at 10% and China owned a massive 
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amount of US debt made many in society believed that American jobs were lost to China, and 
China to have leverage over US politics. China furthermore alarmed the US business 
community by providing subsidies to domestic companies, and giving preference to innovative 
products from China itself over foreign innovations, whereas these companies were violating 
property rights in great numbers (Bader, 2013). 
 Society was not alone in their fear of Chinese economic manipulation. Congress was 
considering imposing a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese imports and installing duties to remedy the 
undervaluation of the Chinese currency. Yet, Obama’s first domestic priority as president was 
to recover the economy which was hit by the 2008 Great Recession, he sought to incorporate 
this task in a China policy to tackle the issues aforementioned. From many discussions, Obama 
and his team concluded that China’s influence on the US economy is quite small. And measures 
such as those proposed in Congress would hurt the US economy more than it would benefit it. 
Therefore, instead of taking hard measures, the government decided to persuade China to 
increase the value of the yuan (Bader, 2013).  
It seems different actors in the US policy elite are divided on the policy of the Pivot. So 
was the public opinion, which displayed that the people were tired of foreign interventions after 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. An opinion poll from 2013 says that only 38% of the people 
disagree with the statement that the US should become more isolationist. This isolationist 
tendency does not extend to the realm of the global economy, however, where interference is 
supported by the public (Pew Research Center, 2013). Interestingly enough, this is the first of 
Obama’s policies under the pivot which got in trouble in the Congress.  
Yet, one account for the policy elites to be hesitant when it comes to executing the pivot 
is that it would be a costly enterprise, whereas the public supported budget cuts and fiscal 
responsibility in great numbers (Mislan, 2017). Mislan claims that the lack of home support for 
the pivot may explain why it seemed to have become less important in Obama’s second 
administration.  
 A special role in US military strategic culture is reserved for technology, which are often 
employed to solve strategic dilemmas. According to Harris, the US reliance on technology in 
warfare is a result of the shortage of labour the country has known since its foundation. Together 
with a great ability to create innovative technology, has led to a strategic culture which is based 
on technology. It is for that reason, that the US has consequently fought against China when it 
performed cyber-attacks on the US (Harris, 2014).  
 
Policy implementation 
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(strategic culture, state-societal relations and domestic institutions) 
By the time president Obama got to power, the United States economy was crippled by the 
Great Recession that had hit the world in 2008 and entailed a global crisis. This is the 
background of the state-societal relations at the time the decision was made to pivot to Asia. 
Obama’s foreign policy received less scrutiny than is usual, because the Republican dominated 
Congress was more concerned with domestic affairs (Nelson, 2017).  
In terms of domestic institutions, several government bodies got in disagreement over 
the execution of the China-policy. Hillary Clinton thought that Bush’s principal model for 
dialogue with China, the strategic economic dialogue, has put too much emphasis on the 
economy, and too little on security and political issues. She wanted to integrate economic, 
security and political issues into a coherent approach towards China. A month-long struggle 
between the State Department and the Treasury Department over who gets to be the dominant 
voice in the dialogue with China erupted. The National Security Council came up with a 
solution to this problem by proposing to the Chinese an annual dialogue between both Clinton 
and the Treasurer (Bader, 2013).  
 Another disagreement in the Obama administration about the execution of its 
relationship with China erupted when the National Security Council suggested president 
Obama to indicate his intention to visit China in November 2009. Clinton and the State 
Department felt, however, that such an intention should not be presented before making sure to 
require performance on certain issues, and to use a visit as a mean of leverage. The National 
Security Council disagreed, fearing this would harm trust and be impossible to achieve (Bader, 
2013). 
 For years, the US had not joined meetings with the ASEAN countries, because of the 
bad conduct of Burma. Obama decided to enter into a dialogue with Burma and not hold the 
other ASEAN members responsible, and decided to join in meetings. This goes without 
problems, but in 2010, the administration had to decide whether or not to join the East Asia 
Summit. The State Department was in favour, but economic agencies thought this would 
underscore APEC’s importance. The National Security Council suggested Clinton would go 
instead of the president (Bader, 2013). 
 In 2014 and 2015, the Department of Defence decided to limit the number of Littoral 
Combat Ships still to be produced. These ships were considered an important weapon to counter 
China’s A2/AD strategies (Gady, 2015). Here we see that in Obama’s second Administration, 
the implementation of the Pivot slowed down. This may have to do with negative public 
opinion. Clinton’s successor as Secretary of State, Kerry, seemed to have deviated from the 
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policy of paying most attention to the Asia Pacific, as he visited the Middle East more than he 
visited the Asia Pacific (Department of State, n.d.).  
  
Concluding Remarks 
This section has shown how the pivot can be explained through a neoclassical realist 
perspective. Neoclassical realism argues that domestic factors influence the perception of 
threats, the decision-making and policy-implementation process.  
We have argued that President Obama perceived threats from China properly, but has 
elected not to act in a way that structural realists would consider inevitable, with regards to 
trade and institutions. Obama’s own beliefs influenced his perception of threats, because he 
believed that cooperation trumps conflict, and that China’s rise can become a force for good. 
He was strengthened in this view by his assessment that the will to make progress was much 
less visible by Middle Eastern people than by the East-Asians (Obama, 2016). Failed attempts 
by the president to fix the economy through imposing tariffs on China led him to believe that 
tariffs are not the right way forward. Simultaneously, the Republican dominated Congress 
blocked Obama’s domestic agenda. His foreign agenda was an easier victory, but also a way to 
hope and win Republican’s sympathy, as the Pivot is hailed more by Republicans than 
Democrats. 
 The decision-making process was not always easy. State-societal relations were 
characterised by the Great Recession, and the president sought to fix the economy by increasing 
international trade. He faced opposition from Congress on multiple occasions, who saw in 
China a currency manipulator which steals away US jobs. Obama’s effort to join TPP enjoyed 
great support amongst some groups in society, notably businesses, who lobbied much for it, but 
resistance from others, including many members in his own Democratic Party. Strategic 
Culture, which historically relies much on technology, played a part in the Administrations 
huge efforts to fight Chinese Cyber-attacks off, without it letting interfere with other business. 
Public opinion is against international security operations, but in favour of interfering in the 
global economy. 
 The implementation of the policy usually went well, although some conflict about the 
precise execution have occurred. The Treasury and State Department were in disagreement over 
which one of them could lead a dialogue with China, and there was disagreement over whether 
or not to commit to joining the EAS. The State Department disagreed with the president over 
whether or not to use a potential presidential visit to China as leverage to get things done as 
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well. In Obama’s second administration, we can see that the pivot is losing speed, indicating 
that it has fallen to the background.  
 All in all, Neoclassical Realism can step in where strategic realism can no longer 
explain. Particularly Obama’s own values and the Great Recession led him to pursue a policy 
of trade and increased interdependence. Strategic Realism cannot account for this, as the 
domestic sphere is not taken into account. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has made the case for the inclusion of domestic agency in the realist theoretical 
paradigm, supporting Rose (1998), and Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), who have made 
the same claim and developed a neoclassical realist framework for international relations 
research. 
 When president Obama announced the Asia Pivot in 2011, the US was facing an 
increased security threat from China. China had been growing for decades, and developed a 
military system which could block the US from entering China’s perceived territory. From 
2008, China has behaved aggressively on the South China Sea, blocking foreign vessels far 
beyond its recognised territorial zone or exclusive economic zone, as recognised by the UN. 
The UN takes a national interest in freedom of the seas, which was under threat by China’s 
actions. China has also bought so much US treasury securities, that China could potentially use 
this as leverage to influence the political decision-making process.  China furthermore 
manipulated it currency, altering the trade balance in the US’ disadvantage, and performed 
military cyber-attacks to the US. 
 With this increased security threat, structural realism expects balancing behaviour. And 
the pivot contains elements which indicate balancing behaviour. Despite the overall defence 
budget being cut, alliances were reinforced, troops sent to the region, FONOPs performed in 
the South China Sea, and anti-cyber-attack units fighting back at China. Yet, the US did not 
decrease its interdependency with China by cutting trade, nor did it pull back from international 
institutions. This cannot be explained by structural realism. 
 Neoclassical realism argues that the policymaking process is influenced by several 
forces. Firstly, leader images influence the process, and Obama’s image of international 
relations is one of pragmatism, and a believe that China’s growth could prove a good thing. 
Furthermore, the US strategic culture relies heavily on technology, state-society relations are 
characterised by a belief in global capitalism, and the Great Recession was the issue of the time, 
impacting all groups in society. Foreign policy decision making knows multiple actors in the 
US system.  
All the aforementioned factors influence the actual policymaking process, which begins 
at the perception of the systemic incentives. Obama understood the risks China posed, but 
believed a pragmatist mix between the carrot and the stick was best to deal with the threat. He 
thought the solution to the Great Recession was in International Trade, and China could help 
with that as well as his foreign policy goals of solving the nuclear threats from Iran and North-
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Korea. Foreign policy was also an easy victory in the Republican dominated House, which 
blocked his domestic agenda, and with the Pivot supported by the Republicans, Obama may 
have hoped that the Republicans would come along a bit more on his domestic agenda. 
The decision-making of the pivot was not so easy, however. Surprisingly enough not 
because many wanted the president to be tougher on China, but because the people were sick 
of US interventionism, and the political actors from Obama’s own party were reluctant to 
support a trade deal. TPP was supported by corporations, republicans and the people, but not 
by the democrats, and labour unions. The military component of the pivot was costly. Lastly, 
the US cultural trust in technology may well explain its tough approach in the cyber war with 
China. 
The policy-implementation phase was characterised by disagreement between different 
parts of the Administration. The State Department, Department of Defence and the President 
occasionally found each other at the other end of the table. In Obama’s second Administration, 
the execution of the Pivot seems to have slowed down. 
Referring back to our hypotheses, we can consider them proven. We expected structural 
realism unable to explain the whole pivot, and neoclassical realism to give a more inclusive 
account of the pivot. In answering our central question to what extent can neoclassical realism 
add explanatory power to structural realist accounts of the US pivot in Asia to contain the rise 
of China? we can now answer: to the extent that structural realism can only explain military 
parts of the pivot, not others. Neoclassical realism can explain all parts of the pivot. 
 The implications hereof are that in due time, we may have to come to the conclusion 
that neoclassical realism is better suited to explain actual state behaviour. This may lead to the 
dethroning of structural realism as realism’s dominant explanatory mechanism after about 50 
years of unchallenged rule. Other implications may be that the determinism underlying Gilpin’s 
power transitioning theory is not matching reality. In short, the implication of this research is 
that states are in fact not unitary actors, but domestic agency matters next to structural 
incentives. 
 But we are not there yet. This research knows some limitations. Firstly, with it being a 
single case study, more case studies should be performed through the same theoretical 
framework before we can jump to conclusions about the actual importance of domestic agency. 
After all, this case may just be an exception to the rule that domestic agency does not matter. 
Secondly, and related, this research adopted a qualitative methodology to gain further 
knowledge about important factors in neoclassical realism. Other research could take a 
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quantitative approach to hierarchically establish the importance of the different factors and 
policy stages.  
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